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Abstract 
Context 
This bachelor’s thesis discusses the usage of System-Theoretic Process Analysis 
(STPA) for privacy engineering. STPA has been developed for safety engineering 
originally. I show how this methodology can be applied to privacy risk analysis by 
using the extension STPA-Priv. I explain why privacy is important and why privacy 
risk analysis can help improve systems regarding privacy. 
Objective 
The goal is to apply the privacy extension of STPA to a real-world Internet of 
Things scenario to determine the applicability and possible problems with this 
methodology. 
Method 
STPA considers safety a system property. I think that privacy is a system property 
as well and therefore STPA can be applied to privacy risk analysis. Most changes 
from STPA to STPA-Priv have been made in its terminology, the process itself 
remains the same. This brings many of the advantages of systems theory to the 
field of privacy engineering, such as the top-down nature of STPA that helps 
handle complex socio-technical systems.  
Results 
I found out that STPA-Priv is a good approach to elicit privacy risks and 
requirements. I was able to elicit many privacy risks from our scenario using STPA-
Priv which shows that the methodology works in general. 
Conclusions 
After all, I can recommend using STPA-Priv to evaluate projects for privacy risks. 
Nevertheless, there are still changes and improvements necessary. However, the 
overall methodology would not be affected by those changes. STPA-Priv is very 
straight-forward for people that are already familiar with STPA.  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Zusammenfassung 
Kontext 
Diese Bachelorarbeit diskutiert die Verwendung systemtheoretischer 
Prozessanalyse (STPA) zur Analyse von Privatsphärerisiken in Systemen, die sich 
aus Hardware- und Softwarekomponenten zusammensetzen. Aber auch externe 
Faktoren sollen berücksichtigt werden. STPA wurde ursprünglich für die 
Sicherheitstechnik entwickelt. Ich zeige, wie STPA durch die Erweiterung STPA-
Priv auch für die Privatsphärerisikoanalyse angewendet werden kann. Ich erkläre, 
warum Privatsphäre wichtig ist und wie STPA-Priv dabei helfen kann, Privatsphäre 
und Datenschutz in Systemen zu verbessern. 
Zielsetzung 
Das Ziel ist es, die Erweiterung von STPA, STPA-Priv, auf ein echtes Internet of 
Things Szenario anzuwenden. Die Anwendung zeigt, inwiefern dieses Verfahren 
tatsächlich zur Erhebung von Privatsphärerisiken anwendbar ist. Außerdem 
werden mögliche Probleme und Schwierigkeiten aufgedeckt. 
Methode 
Für die Anwendung von STPA geht man davon aus, dass Sicherheit eine 
Systemeigenschaft ist. Ich gehe davon aus, dass Privatsphäre auch eine 
Systemeigenschaft ist und dass STPA daher für die Analyse der 
Datenschutzrisiken angewendet werden kann. Die meisten Änderungen von 
STPA-Priv gegenüber STPA bestehen lediglich in der Abänderung der 
Terminologie, der Prozess selbst bleibt der gleiche. Somit können die Vorteile der 
Systemtheorie auch für die Privatsphärerisikoanalyse genutzt werden, 
beispielsweise der Top-down Ansatz von STPA, der dabei hilft komplexe 
soziotechnische Systeme zu handhaben. 
Ergebnisse 
Ich habe herausgefunden, dass STPA-Priv ein guter Ansatz ist, um 
Privatsphärerisiken und Anforderungen für Datenschutz zu ermitteln. Ich konnte 
viele Datenschutzrisiken aus meinem Szenario durch STPA-Priv herausfinden, was 
zeigt, dass die Methodik im Allgemeinen funktioniert. 
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Schlussfolgerungen 
Nachdem ich STPA-Priv selber auf ein Szenario angewandt habe, kann ich die 
Verwendung von STPA-Priv zur Privatsphärerisikoanalyse empfehlen. Jedoch sind 
noch Änderungen und Verbesserungen notwendig. Die grundlegende Struktur von 
STPA-Priv wird allerdings nicht durch diese Änderungen beeinflusst. Wer bereits 
mit STPA vertraut ist, wird sich in STPA-Priv schnell zurecht finden. 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1. Introduction 
1.1. Motivation 
The importance of privacy is increasingly relevant for organizations and individuals 
in a connected world. Complex socio-technical software systems offer 
personalized services, personal assistants, and cloud services. Collecting and 
processing personal information is essential for those services. Governments, 
social networks, search engines, insurance companies, banks, and other 
organizations and institutions already collect and store massive amounts of 
privacy-sensitive data. We now live in an age where digital storage options have 
become so cheap that recording and accumulating all generated and collected 
data is not a problem anymore [1]. Companies can investigate intentions, 
interests, needs, desires, and fears of each user by evaluating these data sets. 
This data enables them to specifically target users by providing manipulative 
information [2]. More and more devices are connected to the Internet — 
ubiquitous computing really becomes ubiquitous in every-day life: The GSM 
Association predicts a number of 24 billion inter-connected devices by 2020 [3]; 
including toothbrushes, refrigerators, television devices, toasters with different 
sensors like cameras, microphones, GPS (global positioning system) sensors, 
motion, temperature and light sensors. Privacy-related risks are often not 
considered by companies when recording or transferring this information to other 
participants or companies. They often stay unconsidered intentionally — just to be 
able to collect more private information [4]. However, “Privacy is a fundamental 
part of human dignity. It is the human right to refuse interference by others in one’s 
life.”, as the European Commission states [5]. Privacy risk analysis could help 
prevent unregulated collection and processing of privacy sensitive information. The 
general idea is to utilize systems theory in order to elicit privacy risks from 
systems. Systems theory has many advantages compared to traditional analysis 
techniques, especially because it treats the system as a whole and does not focus 
on issues on sub-module level. System-theoretic process analysis approaches 
consider safety and security system properties. I expect that privacy can be 
considered a system property as well, this is why system-theoretic approaches 
could also be applied to privacy. System-theoretic process analysis (STPA) has 
been developed to analyze systems for safety-risks and has been extended for the 
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use with security as well. I expect that STPA can be used for privacy-risk analysis 
as well. The recently proposed STPA-Priv [6] methodology for privacy risk analysis 
is still new so there is almost no literature available on this topic. I want to analyze 
the feasibility and applicability of STPA-Priv for privacy analysis in this thesis. 
1.2. Goals 
System-theoretic process analysis (STPA) has already been successfully applied to 
safety (STPA) and security (STPA-Sec) analysis. Privacy has not been considered 
as target for the STPA methodology so far — but with the emerging need for 
privacy-aware systems this approach becomes interesting. The goal is to be able 
to support engineers to plan and execute privacy-aware systems using STPA-Priv 
[6]. As it is a new approach there are not many sources that examine the 
applicability of STPA-Priv including examples, tests, advantages and 
disadvantages. I want to explore this by applying the method to a complex 
scenario. In this thesis I want to find out how STPA-Priv performs in a real-world 
scenario and what changes might be necessary to make it better and more easily 
applicable. I also take a look at tool-support for STPA and how this could help for 
STPA-Priv as well. 
1.3. Thesis Structure 
This bachelor’s thesis is structured in four main chapters: The first one, 
Foundations, explains basic concepts that are necessary for STPA-Priv, including 
systems theory itself, and system-theoretic process analysis (STPA) is described 
using a detailed sample scenario. The security extension STPA-Sec is explained 
as well. The software XSTAMPP which is optimized to support safety engineers is 
introduced and the importance of eHealth is underlined by giving an example 
scenario that is used later on for STPA-Priv analysis. This chapter also includes 
important basics of Privacy and Privacy Risk Models. The next chapter lists 
Related Work and Existing Privacy Analysis Techniques and shows the advantages 
and disadvantages of each methodology. The following chapter describes how 
STPA can be extended for privacy engineering, and the last chapter shows how 
STPA-Priv can be used in the real-world eHealth scenario. In the end, I give a 
conclusion which states how applicable STPA-Priv already is and which changes 
and research are still necessary.  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Parts of this thesis have been submitted as a paper that I wrote together with Kai 
Mindermann, Asim Abdulkhaleq, Christoph Stach and Stefan Wagner. The paper 
is titled “Investigating the Applicability of STPA-Priv for Privacy Engineering”. If 
accepted, this paper will be published in the journal Proceedings on Privacy 
Enhancing Technologies by De Gruyter Open in June 2017.  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2. Foundations 
2.1. Systems Theory 
2.1.1. Systems 
When talking about systems theory it is important to understand what a system 
itself is. A system is “a regularly interacting or interdependent group of items 
forming a unified whole” [7]. When it comes to privacy I am mostly speaking about 
software-systems consisting of submodules. However, hardware-components are 
also part of the system and need to be considered. After all, a system contains all 
modules, components and sub-systems that are necessary and essential for 
running the whole system. 
Systems theory started developing during the 1930s and 1940s in response to the 
limitations of traditional analysis techniques [8]. New theoretical, epistemic and 
mathematical problems in systems with increasing amounts of complexity required 
new analysis techniques [9]. Since then different approaches have been 
developed to study the nature of complex systems of biologic organisms, 
physicochemical systems, psychic systems, social systems and machines such as 
computers with its software-systems [8, 10]. 
2.1.2. Traditional Techniques 
Traditional analysis techniques such as analytic reduction try to break down 
systems into smaller parts to be examined separately — also known as divide and 
conquer [11]. Systems are examined from two different perspectives: Time-
independent characteristics are separated into their hardware and software 
subsystems, whereas time-sensitive activities are divided into isolated events [11]. 
This approach anticipates that each component or event works free from external 
control and constraints to other subsystems or events [11]. The idea of these 
approaches is that isolated events and isolated subsystems operate 
independently from other. However, system behavior in complex socio-technical 
systems cannot always be reduced to single components or events. This is where 
systems theory improves analysis. The focus is not on single components or 
events but on the system as a whole. 
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2.1.3. Advantages of Systems Theory 
In contrast to analytic reduction approaches systems theory considers the system 
as a whole. It is not divided into components or subsystems nor limited to the 
technical aspects of the system. The related environment such as humans 
interacting with the system are also considered [11]. This is especially important in 
today’s complex socio-technical systems, where humans and other environmental 
conditions interact with the system.  
2.1.4. Disadvantages of Systems Theory 
When looking at the system as a whole, it is often criticized that the high-level 
system structure does not recognize details on lower levels that might be relevant 
for the behavior of the system. This could lead to wrong assumptions when 
dealing with the high-level architecture. It is hard to have a complete overview over 
complex systems. 
2.1.5. Hierarchy and Abstraction 
Systems theory follows the rules of hierarchy and levels of organization. Systems 
are not only organized by their submodule’s competences or determination like in 
traditional approaches, but certain levels of abstraction are created to be able to 
manage complex tasks. Higher levels of abstraction control lower levels, whereas 
lover levels provide feedback to higher levels. 
2.2. System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) 
Many methodologies and tools can be used for hazard analysis [12]. Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) [13], Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) [14] and Hazard and 
Operability Analysis (HAZOP) [15] are among the most commonly used 
approaches. Those traditional hazard analysis techniques mostly use sequential or 
epidemiological chains of causality, assuming that failures in a system can be 
traced back to single component failure [8, 16].  
2.2.1. Systems-Theoretic Accident Modeling and Processes (STAMP) 
STPA is based on the Systems-Theoretic Accident Modeling and Processes 
(STAMP) which has been developed by Leveson [8]. The STAMP approach 
assumes that accidents result from insufficient enforcement of safety constraints in 
system design, development, and operation. A system is considered safe when 
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no safety constraints are violated. The systems-theoretic approach treats safety as 
a control problem instead of isolated component failure. Systems theory allows to 
consider more complex socio-technical systems including human interaction, 
system dependencies, or environmental influences. STAMP considers failures to 
be a result of safety constraint violations in component interactions [8]. 
2.2.2. From STAMP to System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) 
STPA is an analysis technique that has been developed to support the analysis of 
safety risks within systems, based on STAMP. The most important aspect of STPA 
is its systems theoretic approach for process analysis. This allows to consider 
indirect relationships between events and social components surrounding the 
system as well as internal dependencies. STPA is a top-down procedure in 
contrast to traditional bottom-up causality models which only focus on single 
component failures. Accidents can be the outcome of complex system 
component interactions which might be not visible on the component level. This 
includes human mistakes, management and organizational errors as well as 
hardware and software failures violating system safety constraints. Indeed, system 
accidents can occur without a single component failing [17]. STPA tries to solve 
this issue and can therefore be useful for drafting systems and systems 
verification. For each accident different hazards can be defined which can lead to 
the accident — after all, occurrences of those hazards should be prevented within 
the system. This is done by defining unsafe control actions and analyzing the 
control structure to find all possible causes for these hazards. 
The methodology of STPA consists of three basic steps [8]: 
1) The fundamental analysis starts with listing losses that should not occur in the 
system. Losses cause damage to humans, the environment, or the system 
itself. Each loss can be assigned to one or more hazardous system states in 
which the system could result in a loss. It is important to differentiate between 
losses and hazards: Losses are not under the system’s control — they are 
accidents that can happen under certain worst-case conditions. These worst-
case conditions are called hazardous system states. And they are, in contrast 
to losses, under the system’s control. The idea is to prevent hazardous system 
states to prevent losses. This is where safety constraints come into place: 
Safety constraints ensure that the system never results in a hazardous state. 
They are created by negating hazards and writing them down as stand-alone 
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statement. Finally, one needs to create a control structure diagram of the 
system — such a diagram should already exist for existing systems, but 
systems that are currently drafted might require creating a new control 
structure diagram. 
2) STPA Step 1: This step is about identifying unsafe control actions. Unsafe 
control actions are those control actions that could violate safety constraints 
from 1). Each unsafe control action is classified as not providing causes 
hazard, providing causes hazard, incorrect timing or wrong order causes 
hazard or stopped too soon or applied too long causes hazard. 
3) STPA Step 2: The last step of STPA is to generate causal scenarios for each 
unsafe control action. This is important to understand how a hazardous 
system state could occur in addition to the results of 2) that show why a 
hazardous system state could occur. 
This concludes the methodology of STPA. The risk management can then 
evaluate those risks and can take countermeasures. 
2.2.3. Control Structure Diagram 
Control structure diagrams are high-level charts which visualize dependencies 
between participants and components within a system. It reflects the hierarchical 
structure and layers of abstraction within the system. Interacting components are 
connected with an annotated arrow. This arrow represents a control action or a 
feedback loop and can have different attributes which contain information about 
the relationship and exchanged data types. 
Control structure diagrams visualize controllers, actuators, processes and sensors 
in so-called feedback loops. Controllers send control actions to actuators and 
receive feedback from sensors on the process, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: A simple control structure diagram featuring one control loop. The 
controller sends a control action to the actuator, and receives feedback on the 
process from sensors. 
2.2.4. Example Problem: Batch Chemical Reactor 
This example shows how a system can fail and result in a hazard despite every 
component is working as expected. The batch chemical reactor has been used 
for pharmaceutical productions in the UK [8].  
The simplified control structure of the batch chemical reactor can be seen in 
Figure 1. The main component of this system is the reactor in which different 
chemicals and catalysts react to produce different chemicals. A valve can be 
opened to start filling a catalyst into the reactor. The cooling system prevents toxic 
vapors from venting and instead makes them reflux into the reactor. The cooling 
system can be controlled by a valve as well which then enables or disables the 
functionality of the condenser. 
Everything is controlled by a software-system. After the software-system opens 
the valve for catalysts to flow into the reactor the reaction will start and get hot. 
This is why the software-system is designed to activate the cooling system 
afterwards to enable the reflux of chemicals. 
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Figure 2: Model of a batch chemical reactor. The reaction itself is happening in 
the reactor in the center. Different valves control the conflux of the catalyst and 
can enable the cooling system in the condenser. All valves are controlled by a 
software system. 
Different sensors, for instance oil-sensors in the gear-box, can provide feedback to 
the software-system. The software then decides what to do next. Whenever 
sensors report problematic data to the computer, the computer should stop 
controlling the system and instead send an alert to the operators to eliminate the 
problem. This procedure has been defined by the systems engineering team. 
After all, the following scenario can occur: The computer opens the catalyst valve 
to start the reaction. Shortly after that some sensors report a problem with the oil 
in the gear — this stops further actions of the computer and alerts the operators 
to take a look at the system and identify the problem. While the operators are 
refilling the oil in the gear, the reactor already gets hot and produces vapor which 
is released to the condenser. However, the computer was not able to start the 
cooling system so far — because system requirements tell the computer that it 
needs to wait for the operators to continue the process. This results in a vent of 
toxic chemicals. 
This example shows why STPA is better than traditional hazard analysis strategies: 
every component did what it was supposed to do, but still a hazard occurred. 
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Traditional hazard analysis focuses on each single component to work without 
problems, but does not consider dependencies between sub-systems. In this 
scenario, STPA could have prevented this hazard [8, 18].  
The following sections describe the general approach of STPA and how it works 
using the chemical batch reactor as an example. Chapter 4 then extends STPA to 
be used for privacy analysis. 
2.2.5. Defining Accidents and Hazards 
The first step of STPA is all about finding possible safety-related accidents (losses) 
and system-states that can lead to such accidents. These system states together 
with their environmental conditions are called hazards. Hazards are system states 
that are under the system’s control, whereas accidents themselves are not 
controllable. The idea is to define constraints around these hazards to ensure that 
these cases do not occur and therefore do not lead to accidents [8]. 
Table 1 shows examples of accidents and hazards: Hazards are system-states 
that can lead to accidents, for example the release of toxic chemicals can lead to 
the expose of people to these chemicals. I want to prevent these accidents, 
therefore I need to prevent all hazards that can lead to those accidents. Workers 
could also get roped into the gear, while refilling the oil. In this case the hazard is 
that the gear is not stopped when oil is being refilled. Another accident that can 
happen is that workers are exposed to toxic chemicals. This can caused by a 
hazardous system state in which the reactor has not been cleaned correctly 
before being opened. 
Table 1: Examples of Accidents and Hazards in the STPA Model using the batch 
chemical reactor scenario [6, 8, 18, 19]. 
Accident or Loss System Hazard
People are exposed to toxic chemicals. Water cooling system not active while 
catalyst in reactor.
Workers get roped into the gear. Gear is not stopped when oil is being 
refilled.
Workers are exposed to toxic chemicals. Reactor is not cleaned correctly before 
being opened.
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2.2.6. Derive Safety Constraints from Identified System Hazards 
The idea of safety constraints is to have list of requirements for the system that 
must be ensured in order to prevent hazardous system states. These safety 
constraints must be valid while the system is running to prevent hazardous system 
states. Safety constraints are generated from the hazard list. The results can be 
seen in Table 2. 
Table 2: Derived safety constraints from system hazards. 
2.2.7. Control Structure Diagram 
Control structure diagrams are high-level charts which visualize dependencies 
between participants and components within a system.  
It is important to pay attention to control and feedback actions between 
components. Different components have different scopes. Some components 
control other components, whereas other components receive commands and 
provide feedback on actions and sensor data. The control structure diagram must 
contain information about controllers and a list of commands and possible 
feedback that is being sent between two components. All these aspects are then 
arranged in a control structure diagram. 
The software system is the central controller of the system. It is able to start and 
stop the catalyst supply and to start and stop the cooling system. Sensors within 
the gearbox report failures and provide feedback. The software system can 
receive input commands from operators and provides feedback to them by 
sending alerts. 
System Hazard Safety Constraint
Water cooling system not active while 
catalyst in reactor.
The water cooling system must be active 
when the catalyst is filled into the reactor.
Gear is not stopped when oil is being 
refilled.
The gear must be stopped when oil is 
being refilled.
Reactor is not cleaned before being 
opened.
The reactor must be cleaned before being 
opened.
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Figure 3: Control structure diagram of the batch chemical reactor scenario. 
2.2.8. Step 1: Identify Unsafe Control Actions (UCAs) 
Unsafe control actions are control actions that can violate safety constraints when 
executed. The goal of this step is to find control actions that violate safety 
constraints and therefore can lead to hazardous system states. In the end, these 
unsafe control actions are the flaw of my system and need to be prevented by 
engineers. 
Unsafe control actions can be generated by filling out the unsafe control action 
table. This table includes all control actions from the control structure diagram. 
The table provides different types for each control action which can violate safety 
constraints: not providing causes hazard, providing causes hazard, incorrect 
timing or wrong order causes hazard, stopped too soon or applied too long 
causes hazard, as seen in Table 1. Control actions in combination with these 
categories lead to unsafe control actions. All hazardous system states are 
underlined in Table 3. 
Unsafe control actions can be caused by a mis-communication between 
components. Withholding information, providing information or providing 
information with bad timing can lead to hazardous system states [6]. This is where 
the four categories of  
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Table 3: Examples of control actions and unsafe control actions using the batch 
chemical reactor scenario [6, 8, 18, 19]. Hazardous system states are underlined. 
2.2.9. Step 2: Generating Causal Scenarios 
The last step of STPA concludes causal factors for unsafe control actions. The 
goal is to find scenarios in the system that can lead to unsafe system states. This 
is not limited to simple components, but can occur in conjunction with 
components and control actions within the whole system. 
In my scenario different problems can be determined: After analyzing the unsafe 
control action table one can see that the cooling system must always enabled 
before the catalyst supply is started. It is also important to receive feedback from 
all sub-systems, when failures occur. For example, the cooling system failing for 
some reason requires stopping the catalyst supply as well. 
Control 
Action
Violated safety 
constraint
Not 
providing 
causes 
hazard
Providing 
causes 
hazard
Incorrect 
timing / 
wrong order 
causes 
hazard
Stopped 
too soon / 
applied too 
long 
causes 
hazard
Start 
Catalyst 
Supply
The water cooling 
system must be 
active when the 
catalyst is filled 
into the reactor.
Starting when 
cooling 
system offline
Starting more 
than X 
seconds 
before cooling 
system started
Stop 
Catalyst 
Supply
The water cooling 
system must be 
active when the 
catalyst is filled 
into the reactor.
Not stopping 
when cooling 
system offline
Stopping 
catalyst after 
cooling system 
has been 
stopped
Start 
Cooling 
System
The water cooling 
system must be 
active when the 
catalyst is filled 
into the reactor.
Not started 
when catalyst 
supply started
Starting more 
than X 
seconds after 
catalyst supply 
started
Stop 
Cooling 
System
The water cooling 
system must be 
active when the 
catalyst is filled 
into the reactor.
Stopping 
while catalyst 
supply is 
active
Stopping 
before catalyst 
supply 
stopped
Stopping 
before 
catalyst 
supply 
stopped
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2.3. STPA-Sec: STPA for Security 
Young and Leveson [20] developed an extension of STPA for security analysis. 
This extension is called STPA-Sec (STPA for security). The general procedure 
remains the same which makes it consistent for users that have already 
experience with STPA. However, some terminology needed to be changed in 
order to make the approach coherent for security: Hazards are called 
vulnerabilities, unsafe control actions are called insecure control actions. 
Additionally there is a change when generating causal scenarios: Whereas safety 
analysts try to find scenarios in which unintentional actions can lead to losses, 
security analysts also need to find scenarios in which intentional actions can lead 
to losses caused by malevolent actors [20]. After all, the three steps of STPA-Sec 
are: 1) Identify losses and vulnerabilities, create the control structure diagram; 2) 
identify insecure control actions; 3) identify causal scenarios for insecure control 
actions considering intentional actions. 
2.4. eXtensible STAMP platform (XSTAMPP) 
XSTAMPP  (eXtensible STAMP platform) is a software platform that helps 1
engineers to implement the STAMP procedure and is available under the open-
source license “Eclipse public license” [21]. The tool has been published and is 
maintained by Balzer, Abdulkhaleq and Wagner [22]. XSTAMPP is built on top of 
Eclipse using the Eclipse Plugin Development Environment and Rich Client 
Platform. Many plugins are available for the current version XSTAMPP 2.1.1. These 
plugins offer support for STPA for safety engineering, STPA-Sec for security 
engineering, and STPA-Priv for privacy engineering. I will be using XSTAMPP with 
its STPA-Priv plugin in my scenario to support the process of identifying losses, 
hazards, safety constraints or their appropriate correspondents in privacy 
engineering. 
 http://www.xstampp.de1
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2.5. Internet of Things (IoT) and Electronic Health 
(eHealth) 
The internet of things has already become part of the everyday life in many 
households and companies. Smart devices that control and capture information 
are widely spread in cars, homes and offices. This trend will continue in the next 
years, since there will be more than 24 billion connected devices by the year of 
2020 [3]. Smartphones are a great example of how technology spreads and 
becomes part of the everyday life. In his publication “Generation Smartphone” [23] 
Siewiorek describes how smartphones can help humans handle tasks, coach 
them or monitor them with existing technology and future technologies. This 
includes health-related issues ranging from detecting tired drivers in cars to 
capturing essential vital functions [23]. Smartphones can already monitor many 
factors of our life, including sensors and algorithms such as GPS location, 
emotions (audio analysis, face recognition, heart rate) or posture (accelerometer) 
[24], just to name a few. Smartphones, and smart devices in general, are already 
part of the ubiquitous computing internet of things network today. Their influence 
will be growing in the future. The amount of data they can monitor is stunning and 
holds advantages for health and living conditions as well. Smart devices will be 
able to perform periodic screenings at home without the presence of a physician. 
Chronic diseases such as diabetes mellitus challenge the healthcare system, 
facing high treatment costs and overstrained physicians. Smart devices can help 
to overcome these problems by increasing the number of preventive medical 
checkups, allowing a comprehensive monitoring of patients, and lowering the 
costs. 
Serious games are a use case of eHealth technology. They can help integrate 
eHealth treatments into the daily routine of young patients. Especially children are 
able to handle their  disease much better, because the game reminds and 
motivates them to comply with the therapy [25]. However, users of such 
applications are not the only stakeholders that can profit from eHealth technology. 
In his publication [25] Knöll describes how traditional eHealth data of smart 
devices could be enriched with additional contextual data. This helps researchers 
to find correlations between the health state and the person’s environment. As an 
example, unhealthy places in a city could be identified by urban planners [25].  
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Internet of things and electronic health approaches are very controversial when it 
comes to data collection and sharing. On the one hand the society could profit 
from huge accumulated data sets, that could help to identify unhealthy places, as 
suggested by Knöll [25]. On the other hand many patients are afraid to provide 
their sensitive health data to third parties. Security in general and privacy in 
particular are the biggest concerns [26, 27]. Their awareness for privacy and 
security is great at first. However, refusing to use a service completely does not 
solve the privacy concerns in the first place. I think that a strategic use of a privacy 
risk analysis methodology such as STPA-Priv could help make such solutions safe 
and secure regarding privacy and, in the end, help make them socially acceptable. 
2.6. Privacy and Privacy Risk Models 
Privacy often overlaps with fields of security but both live within their own scope 
and have a right to exist. Security has been described by Saltzer and Schroeder in 
their 1975-released paper as “mechanisms and techniques that control who may 
use or modify the computer or the information stored in it” [28] whereas privacy is 
described as “the ability of an individual (or organization) to decide whether, when 
and to whom personal (or organizational) information is released” [28]. However, 
their descriptions lack the consideration of computer networks, such as the 
internet. In general, security deals with defending actively attacking enemies who 
want to access information. This can happen remotely or while having hardware 
access. Privacy ensures that information that has been revealed to specific entities 
in moderation and under certain conditions is not disclosed unintentionally to 
prevent inconvenient or adverse consequences. 
Privacy covers a wide range of multi-dimensional issues [29]. The perception of 
privacy can differ among cultures, countries and institutions depending on their 
values and interests. The European Commission published a list of possibilities 
that can be applied to data when it comes to processing. This includes, but is not 
limited to: collection, organization, combination or disclosure of data [30]. The full 
list can be seen in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: An overview of possibilities to process data, according to the European 
Commission [30]. 
Privacy risk models draw a framework under which a common understanding of 
the wide field of privacy is possible. They help to understand which aspects of a 
system need to be considered when analyzing privacy risks. Hereinafter, I present 
two examples of privacy risk models. The first one, Calo’s privacy harms, [31] is a 
more general approach that still covers the most important privacy harms, 
whereas the LINDDUN privacy threat catalog [32] covers privacy in depth and very 
detailed. 
2.6.1. Calo’s subjective/objective privacy harms 
Calo’s privacy harms [31] cover a rather general framework for privacy harms. 
They are split into two groups: Subjective privacy harms cover the perception of 
unwanted surveillance, objective privacy harms cover the usage of private 
information. The author argues that most privacy harms can be categorized in 
either one of those categories. Subjective privacy harms cover incidents such as 
observation, whereas objective harms cover incidents such as identity theft or 
using a suspect’s blood alcohol level as incident against them. 
2.6.2. LINDDUN Privacy Threat Framework 
The LINDDUN privacy threat tree, as described by Wuyts, Scandariato and 
Joosen [32], is very detailed and covers a wide range of issues. This threat tree is 
part of the comprehensive LINDDUN methodology which includes a data flow 
analysis as well. The threat framework drawn by LINDDUN includes threat trees on 
the following issues: 
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• Linkability covers activity where data collected from different users or groups is 
being linked, but also includes different (anonymous) data sets that are linked to 
the same person. 
• Identifiability covers scenarios where subjects and anonymous data sets can be 
identified. 
• Non-repudiation is the case when a user of a system is not able to deny a claim 
because the system has evidence that can prove the claim. 
• Detectability covers activity where a system can ensure that a data set of 
interest exists — but might not have access to it. However, the knowledge that a 
specific data set exists can already reveal certain conclusions. 
• Information Disclosure occurs when information is revealed unintentionally. This 
heavily depends on security. 
• Unawareness describes situations in which the user is not aware of 
consequences that can occur when sharing their information or that information 
is shared at all when using a service. 
• Non-compliance describes situations in which institutions do not comply to 
rules, laws and policies regarding privacy. 
LINDDUN has been analyzed in empirical studies that tested how different threat 
models affect the traceability of different privacy threats. These studies showed 
that this threat model is easy to learn but still provides reliable results in 
comparison to experts. LINDDUN's threat trees have been considered useful in 
practice. LINDDUN itself provides a whole bottom-up privacy analysis pipeline as 
well, however, I only utilize their threat tree in my scenario [33]. 
2.6.3. Open-Loop Nature of Privacy 
Privacy can only be guaranteed in closed systems which provide full control of 
their components. When components communicate with instances from different 
systems one has to trust those entities to follow the protocol participants have 
agreed on. Constraints that come along with these protocols can hardly be 
enforced but need to be trusted most of the time. They are called open loop 
constraints. 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3. Related Work and Existing Privacy 
Analysis Approaches 
Existing privacy analysis techniques have different advantages and disadvantages. 
This section discusses some approaches and highlights general problems with 
these techniques. 
3.1. Privacy Risk Management 
Privacy risk management is the general term which describes the handling of 
privacy risks within systems. From the management’s perspective privacy risks 
consist of two factors: the first one is the likelihood of a problematic action, the 
second one the impact of this action. Multiplying those values results in the 
privacy risk that can be evaluated and eliminated [34].  
The resulting privacy risk can be used by managers to evaluate different risks and 
decide which risks need to be eliminated. The elicitation of risks, their likelihood 
and impact are not part of this approach. This technique can be used on top of 
existing approaches. 
3.2. Analyze Data Flow to Elicit Privacy Risks 
Different data flow analysis techniques have been developed to track data flow 
and elicit privacy risks. The approach described by Lu and Li [35] includes different 
existing data flow analysis techniques such as "conditional flow identification" and 
"joint flow tracking". They implemented a system that analyzes Android application 
files for malicious data flow. This includes revealing contacts, call logs, browser 
history, SMS history, GPS or unique user IDs. A similar system for iOS applications 
has been developed by Egele and Kruegel [36]. Their system is able to detect data 
flow in compiled Objective-C binaries, similar to Lu’s and Li's approach. Another 
interesting approach has been developed by Enck and Gilbert [37]. Their system 
Privacy Risk =
Likelihood of a 
problematic action x
Impact of a 
problematic 
action
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can analyze data flow in Android applications in real-time, in contrast to the static 
approaches of Lu, Li, Egele and Kruegel. Enck and Gilbert’s system TaintDroid can 
be run on productive devices in the background to spot malicious app requests or 
for testing purposes to see if an application is requesting specific information. 
Analyzing data flow, as suggested by Lu and Li [35], Egele and Kruegel [36] and 
Enck and Gilbert [37], focuses on data sharers and data observers and data 
exchanged between them. However, these three approaches are optimized for 
mobile applications and only consider access to initial information sources, such 
as contact information but do not elicit privacy risks that can occur with data that 
has been exchanged with other systems or participants. 
They do not consider what happens with this information outside of their scope. In 
many cases, it is necessary to exchange information for a service to be able to 
work as expected. Revealing private information is not always a privacy risk. Later 
on when data is exchanged with other partners or combined with other data sets 
privacy risks can occur as well which would not be covered by these approaches. 
Another example for data flow analysis is the LINDDUN methodology, described 
by Wuyts, Scandariato and Joosen [32]. LINDDUN includes a privacy threat 
catalog but offers a data flow analysis technique as well. This approach uses a 
data flow diagram as a starting point to find privacy threats. A privacy threat 
catalog is then used to categorize each entity of the diagram into seven possible 
threat categories: linkability, identifiability, non-repudiation, detectability, 
information disclosure, unawareness and non-compliance. This methodology goes 
even further and describes a process to resolve privacy threats: The data flow 
analysis uses the threat catalogue to elicit privacy requirements and to be able to 
suggest solutions. 
However, it is difficult to analyze complicated socio-technical systems using this 
approach, because it is focused on a bottom-up data flow analysis. Privacy risks 
often result from human interaction or interactions with different systems which 
makes it difficult for bottom-up analysis techniques to unveil these. Indeed, this 
drawback has been proven by Wuyts, Scandariato and Joosen in a set of 
extensive empirical studies [33]. 
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3.3. Series of Open Questions to Elicit Privacy Risks 
Hong, Ng, Lederer and Landay [29] developed an approach that uses a set of 
open questions, such as Who are the users of the system? and What kinds of 
personal information are shared? to stimulate engineers to think about 
consequences and possible privacy risks. 
The big advantage of this approach is that open questions can help elicit unique 
privacy risks — but this approach involves risks as well: These questions can only 
be a rough guideline for finding privacy risks, they are not a straight-forward 
approach. They offer a framework for risk analysis but do not necessarily lead to a 
complete privacy risk analysis.  
Approaches that involve specific requirements on their risk elicitation process and 
a specific pipeline would lead to more consistent and therefore more reliable 
results. 
3.4. User-Level Privacy 
3.4.1. Control and Feedback 
Control and feedback [38] is an approach that gives users full control of their data. 
Users can decide whether or not which kind of data is revealed to entities, and 
they receive feedback whenever data is recorded or revealed. This means that 
privacy lies in the responsibility of each user. Control and feedback is a good 
mechanism to keep users up to date about sensor and data usage. The user is 
aware of ongoing processes and can decide if they accept certain capabilities. 
However, it can be annoying for users to decide this each time when using the 
system. Storing the preference of users might lead to unaware situations in which 
the user forgets that they allowed access to certain sensors. After all, this strategy 
helps to create awareness for privacy in direct user interaction. However, this 
cannot replace further and more in-depth analysis which handles privacy risks 
outside of the direct user scope, such as processing and sharing of data. 
Figure 5 shows the four relevant categories: Capture, construction, accessibility 
and purpose.  
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Figure 5: Control and Feedback: Users have full control what happens to their 
data. 
Figure 6 shows a real-world example how capture and purpose are implemented 
in Apple’s iOS operating system: The app on the left side needs to ask for 
permission to be able to access privacy-relevant information, such as GPS 
positions. The alert view gives an explanation which data is being accessed 
(capture), and how and why this data is being used (purpose). The screenshot on 
the right side indicates that data is captured in the background (in this case 
microphone) by showing the prominent red bar on the top of the screen. This kind 
of feedback ensures that the user does not forget and is aware of software 
collecting data in the background. 
" 		 "  
Figure 6: Two real-world examples for Control and Feedback. On the left side 
considering capture and purpose. The alert view says: “Do you allow ‘Krautfest’ to 
access you location when using the app? The locating is being used to show your 
position on the map and to show the nearest bus stops”. The screenshots on the 
right side indicates that audio is recoded in the background by showing the red 
bar in a prominent location. 
Capture
Construction
Accessibility
Purposes
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3.5. General Problems of Existing Privacy Analysis 
Techniques 
Existing privacy analysis techniques, like the ones mentioned above, do not 
consider the open-loop nature of many privacy-related issues: Many aspects of 
privacy are defined in laws, terms of use or privacy policies — and it is not 
possible to ensure that a user really read the policy and knows what can happen 
to their data. 
Abstraction is another problem of current privacy analysis techniques: Many 
systems are embedded into complicated socio-technical environments. A 
technical bottom-up approach by looking at data flow does not always fulfill the 
purpose. Human interaction, internal components and interactions with other 
systems result in a complex system, so bottom-up analysis techniques are no 
longer objective. Additionally, it is very hard to verify if the company operates in 
conformity with their privacy policy. This is especially true for large companies with 
many departments. Therefore, the policy alone does not guarantee the 
confidentiality of the data, it must rather be enforced within the company as well 
as verified from the user's point of view. 
3.6. Privacy in Health-Related Scenarios 
Meingast, Roosta and Sastry [39] describe emerging privacy issues with health-
related information. However, they do not limit their work to be applied to heath-
related privacy issues. They consider different fields that benefit from these results 
as well, including financial services or internet shops. They present existing 
solutions and future work to solve these issues, such as "clear attributes for role 
based access", "encryption", "authentication mechanisms", "policy development", 
"rules on patients privacy at home" and "data mining rules and technological 
measures” [39]. 
Kaletsch and Sunyaev [40] analyzed different cloud-based health scenarios and 
found multiple common privacy threats caused by different systems. They found 
out that social features, selling medical information, advertising and analytics are 
the most common privacy threats among cloud-based health services. They also 
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started to develop a privacy framework for health platforms to be able to ensure 
the patients' privacy. 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4. STPA Extension for Privacy Risk 
Analysis: STPA-Priv 
STPA is an analysis technique that has originally been developed to support the 
analysis of safety risks within systems. However, STPA is not limited to safety-
related topics: A new sub-type of STPA, called STPA-Sec, has been optimized to 
help finding security risks within systems [20]. 
Shapiro extended STPA-Sec to be used for the elicitation of privacy risks [6, 19]. 
His proposed extension is called STPA-Priv. It combines the existing advantages 
of STPA with an extension for privacy analysis. This includes the top-down 
principle of STPA to be able to handle complex socio-technical systems. Parts of 
the process have been renamed, but the overall steps of STPA stay the same. 
This chapter explains how the extension of STPA for privacy looks like. Focusing 
on privacy solely is not straight-forward due to the huge overlapping of privacy 
and security. To ensure privacy in a system it is necessary to ensure security in the 
first place — technical security aspects like encryption are the foundation for 
preventing all privacy risks [29]. 
4.1. Definitions and Renaming 
4.1.1. Losses and Accidents 
Loss or accidents in traditional STPA are always related to a loss of human life, 
injuries or destruction of expensive hardware. However, privacy violations often do 
not lead to accidents which threaten human life but could lead to embarrassing, 
awkward and adverse situations for individuals, or emotional damage in general. 
Even more threatening for individuals are the consequences of identity theft. This 
is why losses and accidents are (re)named to adverse consequences in respect to 
privacy [34]. 
4.1.2. Unsafe Control Actions 
Unsafe control actions in STPA are commands sent between participants of a 
system, that can lead to a hazardous system state. Adverse consequences are 
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also considered a result of unsafe control actions. Accordingly unsafe control 
actions are (re)named to privacy-compromising control actions [6]. 
4.1.3. Safety Constraints 
Safety constraints in STPA-Priv are simply called privacy constraints. Their 
functionality remains the same. 
4.1.4. Privacy Risk Model 
Discussing which risk model should be the foundation of the privacy risk analysis 
is essential. I presented two risk models in section 2.6: A general approach called 
Calo’s subjective/objective privacy harms and the more detailed LINDDUN privacy 
threat catalog. Privacy risk models draw a framework under which a common 
understanding of the wide field of privacy is possible. 
4.1.5. Open-Loop Constraints 
Open-loop constraints in general are constraints that cannot be ensured or 
enforced in a system. A common example for open-loop constraints are privacy 
policies which a user needs to read before using a service — of course it cannot 
be enforced that a user has read it, but it might contain important information 
regarding the handling of sensitive data. The same problem occurs the other way 
around: how can a user know that a provider of a service is using the data only in 
a manner that is described in the privacy policy? Both scenarios can lead to 
adverse consequences for the user, however, there is not much one can do about 
it. Another example are privacy-related laws which enforce companies to handle 
data in a specific manner, however, it is not always possible to check how data is 
really handled by companies or governments. What happens with data in general 
that is provided to an entity? How can one ensure that the data is only being used 
in the promised manner? The only solution in this case is: trust no one, keep your 
data for yourself. 
After all, my system could contain an unlimited number of edge cases and 
participants with more or less controllable constraints [29]. Therefore I cannot 
ensure perfect privacy but aim for a system with reasonable privacy.  
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4.1.6. Participants and their Relationships 
An important part of privacy risk analysis are the different participants and their 
relationships: Do participants trust each other? Who are data providers and who 
are data observers? Is it a one-sided relationship with an unbalanced level of 
trust? It can help to arrange all participants in a two-dimensional grid, representing 
strong or weak commercial or social interests of participants, as illustrated in 
Figure 7. These assessments can later help in the process of STPA-Priv to elicit 
privacy risks and create the control structure diagram. 
"   
Figure 7: Different kinds of relationships on a two-dimensional grid: Are 
relationships more of a social or a commercial interest? Are relationships weak or 
strong? Classifying relationships can help to identify possible risks later on. 
4.1.7. Data Flow 
Thinking about exchanged data types helps to identify adverse consequences 
later on. Ask yourself questions like What kind of data is exchanged between 
participants? or Is data transferred completely, or are data sets filtered 
beforehand? or What information could be reconstructed from data sets? or To 
whom could the information be forwarded?. These questions are similar to the 
approach showed in section 3.3 where open questions are being used to help 
engineers to determine privacy risks. In my case I am using these questions as a 
starting point for eliciting adverse consequences. Figure 8 shows different kinds of 
data sets that could be transferred between participants.  
Social
Commercial 
Market 
Interests
Strong
Weak
Family
Friends
Acquaintances
Strangers
Co-Workers
Employer
Companies
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Figure 8: Data flow: What kind of data is transferred to other participants? 
Classifying exchanged data can help identify adverse consequences. 
4.1.8. Control Structure Diagrams 
Control structure diagrams in privacy-sensitive systems can be used the same 
way as in traditional STPA. However, to prevent misunderstandings changes to the 
terminology would be useful. Sensors that provide feedback to the controller in 
traditional STPA are not always hardware sensors in STPA-Priv. Especially in 
eHealth scenarios with GPS sensors and heart rate sensors this can lead to 
confusion, because those sensors are not sensors in the context of control loops. 
It would be useful to rename control loop sensors in feedback mechanisms. This 
has two positive effects: First, the risk of misunderstanding the meaning of 
“sensor” is eliminated, and second, it is more clear that a feedback mechanism in 
STPA-Priv is not limited to hardware components. 
The second change refers to the terminology of actuators. This is a very hardware-
specific concept as well. Actuators are devices that convert electric signals into 
mechanical movement. A renaming to initiator would make sense for privacy. 
Additionally there is sometimes no additional initiator between a controller and the 
process itself when it comes to privacy-aware systems, because the controller is 
the initiator. 
4.2. STPA-Priv Extension for XSTAMPP 
The software tool XSTAMPP offers support for STPA-Priv via a plugin. Before 
applying STPA-Priv to a scenario this extension should be installed in order to 
support the process. The plugin can be downloaded from XSTAMPP’s 
Full Data Set
Partial Data Set
Specific Data Set
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sourceforge webpage  [41]. The required file is called updatesite.zip. Unzip the 2
file to extract its content. 
After downloading the plugin, open XSTAMPP and go to Help →  Install New 
Software. From there select Add and click on Local. Not you can select the 
previously downloaded folder updatesite. Select STPA-Priv and XSTPA-Priv and 
click on Next. Accept the necessary license agreements and follow the procedure. 
In the end, after XSTAMPP has been restarted you should see the new extension 
when clicking on File → Create New Project. 
4.3. Methodology of STPA-Priv 
STPA originally has been designed to analyze systems and their environment 
including unpredictable factors such as humans. The goal of STPA-Priv is now to 
utilize this methodology for privacy risk analysis. The general process of STPA-Priv 
includes similar steps as in STPA:  
1) Fundamental analysis in which privacy analysts identify adverse 
consequences, hazardous system states, privacy constraints and draw the 
high-level privacy control structure diagram.  
2) STPA-Priv step 1: Identify privacy-compromising control actions in the control 
structure diagram in four different categories: not providing causes hazard, 
providing causes hazard, wrong timing or order causes hazard or applying too 
long/stopping too soon causes hazard.  
3) STPA-Priv step 2: Causal analysis in which the privacy analysts identify causal 
factors and scenarios for each privacy-compromising control action to 
understand how they could occur. These steps and their results are depicted 
in Figure 9. 
 https://sourceforge.net/projects/stpa-for-privacy-analysis/files/?source=navbar2
"  of "43 84
"  
Figure 9: The STPA-Priv pipeline and examples for results of each step. The 
pipeline starts with identifying adverse consequences, continues with hazardous 
system states, deriving privacy constraints, creating the control structure diagram, 
identifying privacy compromising control actions and finally generating causal 
scenarios. 
4.3.1. Identify involved participants and their relationships 
Before starting to analyze a system one has to be aware of all participants in the 
scenario. This helps identify all relationships and find adverse consequences later. 
The first set of participants can be taken straight from the scenario. If participants 
have been disregarded initially, they can still be added during the process 
iteratively. It makes sense to arrange participants in a two-dimensional grid, as 
shown in Figure 7. 
4.3.2. Identify Adverse Consequences 
Finding and defining adverse consequences in the system is the first important 
step of STPA-Priv. Finding adverse consequences requires experts that are aware 
of the features provided by the system. However, it is not necessary to know the 
implementation of each component, since STPA is a top-down approach. Adverse 
consequences are those consequences that should not occur in my system. 
Stakeholders need to agree on adverse consequences that should be prevented 
[8]. A privacy framework, such as LINDDUN privacy threat tree catalog [32] or 
Calo’s subjective/objective privacy harms [6, 31], is used as a starting point — 
threats described in these frameworks need to be applied to the scenario to 
generate adverse consequences.  
Elaborating adverse consequences is the counterpart to accidents in standard 
STPA. It is important to identify involved participants and their relationships and to 
select a privacy framework first to be aware of the scenario and have a common 
understanding of privacy.  
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Privacy risk models, such as the LINDDUN privacy threat model, help analysts 
elicit adverse privacy consequences. The standard LINDDUN methodology 
derives privacy threat scenarios from data flow diagrams including entities, data 
stores, data flows and processes [32]. With STPA-Priv I want to prevent this 
bottom-up approach which does not fit for complicated socio-technical 
environments. This is why I concentrate on participants, their relationships and 
knowledge about my scenario to find adverse consequences: I analyze how 
linkability, identifiability, non-repudiation, detectability, information disclosure, 
unawareness and non-compliance can be present in my scenario, for participants 
and relationships. 
4.3.3. Identify Hazardous System States 
Each adverse consequence can be triggered by one or more system states 
together with environmental conditions of the system. They are called hazardous 
system states. Hazards are system states that are under the system’s control, 
whereas adverse consequences themselves are not controllable. This is why I 
want to prevent hazardous system states, because their appearance is under the 
system's control — and preventing hazardous system states prevents adverse 
consequences. 
4.3.4. Derive Privacy Constraints from Identified System Hazards 
Privacy constraints are constraints that ensure that hazardous system states are 
not occurring. Each hazardous system state must be covered by a privacy 
constraint. Privacy constraints are a positive formulation of hazards in order to 
prevent them. 
4.3.5. Control Structure Diagram 
Control structure diagrams in standard STPA highlight controllers, actuators, 
processes, sensors, control actions, and feedback within systems. When it comes 
to privacy it is not always possible to provide feedback on processes. I am 
speaking of open-loop controllers in such cases. 
Overall there are three different levels of control loops that can be applied to 
privacy scenarios: 
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1. High-level control loops represent the general feedback loop which ensures 
that systems are conform to privacy laws and policies. This applies to many 
systems: The whole system is controlled by laws, defining which strategies 
and policies are legal in respect to privacy. The actuator that actually starts the 
process can differ from system to system. In many cases people agree to use 
a service in order to improve or analyze their financial situation (e.g., FinTec), 
their health condition (e.g., eHealth) or the overall improvement of workflows 
and living conditions (e.g., Internet of Things). The process itself is represented 
while using the system. And the sensor is represented by the awareness for 
privacy in this system: Each user needs to be aware of privacy and needs to 
check if the device usage violates privacy laws and how the privacy policy is 
shaped. The feedback which comes back to the system can be as simple as 
not buying or not using the product anymore if any violations have been 
detected. Figure 10a shows how high-level control loops can look like. 
 
"  
Figure 10a: A general example for high-level control loops that is part of many 
privacy-related systems. 
2. User-level control loops represent control loops that directly interact with the 
user. These control loops implement technologies similar to control and 
feedback from section 3.4. This ensures that the user is aware of sensor data 
that is currently being accessed, data that is transmitted or that the user has 
read the privacy policy that comes with this system. Figure 10b illustrates how 
user-level control loops can look like. 
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Figure 10b: A general example for user level control loops.  
3. Technical control loops are control loops that ensure the technical 
requirements of the system. This includes that certain (raw) data sets do not 
leave the system or only if filtered beforehand. The example shows how the 
control loop is structured. It is the responsibility of specific data controllers to 
provide data sets for external stakeholders. Before these data sets are 
provided they are processed through the feedback loop. Sensitive parts of 
these data sets are removed. All data sets are checked by a feedback 
mechanism for their sensitivity. If everything is fine the data can be transferred. 
The diagram in Figure 10c shows how technical control loops can look like. 
 
"  
Figure 10c: A general example for technical control loops. Data sets are prepared 
to be shared by removing sensitive content.  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4.3.6. Step 1: Identify Privacy Compromising Control Actions (UCAs) 
Privacy-compromising control actions are control actions that can violate privacy 
constraints when being executed. The goal of this step is to find control actions 
that would violate privacy constraints and therefore can lead to hazardous system 
states. In the end, these privacy-compromising control actions are the flaw of the 
system and need to be prevented by engineers. Privacy-compromising control 
actions show where the system could result in a hazardous system state. Later 
on, in step 2, causal scenarios are generated for each control action. 
Each privacy constraint is enforced by a controlling component. All controlling 
components are part of the control structure. A control action could lead to a 
corresponding hazardous system state. Malfunctions of privacy-compromising 
control actions can be classified in one of those four categories: 
• Not providing the control action, when it should be provided causes a hazard. 
• Providing the control action, when it should not be provided causes a hazard. 
• Providing the control action too early, too late or in wrong order causes a 
hazard. 
• Stopping the control action or applying it too long causes a hazard. 
When looking at the privacy constraints one has to find the appropriate control 
action from the control structure that is responsible for ensuring the privacy 
constraint. 
4.3.7. Step 2: Generating Causal Scenarios 
The previous step generated a list of privacy-compromising control actions that 
can violate privacy constraints and therefore potentially cause hazardous system 
states. They describe what could go wrong. The last step of STPA-Priv concludes 
scenarios that describe how a privacy-compromising control action might be 
executed. The goal is to find causal scenarios in the system that can lead to 
privacy-compromising system states. This is not limited to simple components, 
but can occur in conjunction with components and control actions within the 
whole socio-technical system. This is also often referred to as worst case 
scenario. One can look at hazards that are caused by these control actions to find 
causal scenarios. 
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Control actions that can be referred to a causal scenario require a risk 
management response. This includes adding systematic test cases that can 
reproduce the causal scenario.  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5. Applying STPA-Priv to Internet of Things 
Scenario 
The goal of this thesis is to apply STPA-Priv to an Internet of Things scenario and 
analyze its applicability this way. This chapter describes which internet of things 
scenario has been selected and why — I then apply STPA-Priv to this scenario. I 
use the tool XSTAMPP with its STPA-Priv extension as support while executing 
STPA-Priv. Click on File →  Create New Project →  STPA-Priv in order to get 
started. 
5.1. Internet of Things Scenario 
Many scenarios would fit well for an evaluation of STPA-Priv – smart TVs, instant 
messengers, smart home or eHealth scenarios. Almost every device or service 
collects, processes and transmits data and would therefore be a good scenario 
for STPA-Priv. I decided to apply STPA-Priv to an eHealth scenario, because it 
covers a wide range of topics and difficulties regarding privacy: extremely sensitive 
data of different types and many stakeholders with different interests.  
Knöll developed an eHealth system together with the Olgahospital, a children's 
hospital in Stuttgart, Germany [25]. I am using the enhanced version of this 
scenario which has been developed by Stach [42]. The general idea is to use the 
serious game Candy Castle to motivate children to follow the therapy suggested 
by their physician. Patient’s parents, their physician, insurance companies and 
urban planners are part of this system as well. All of them have different 
expectations and requirements for the product and data sets. This makes it 
interesting to analyze. The overall goal is to support diabetic children using smart 
devices: Children are motivated to inject insulin by giving them privileges in the 
serious game which they are playing on their device. Blood sugar values are 
measured automatically and fed into the game. All blood sugar data points are 
then stored along with the current location and a timestamp. The same data is 
also being used to notify parents when dangerous blood sugar values occur. 
Physicians and other medical instances can also be granted with these data sets 
to improve the long-term therapy. Urban planners receive accumulated health and 
location records to be able to determine dangerous or unhealthy regions in cities. 
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Insurance companies are interested in data sets as well — to adjust insurance 
rates, which can lead to advantages or disadvantages for affected individuals. This 
is the first obvious case where privacy and privacy constraints play an important 
role, because patients do not want to get disadvantages in their insurance rate. 
Aside from the fact that there are many more privacy concerns regarding all 
stakeholders. Not every stakeholder requires access to all data sets, the access 
must be restricted. Most of the captured data points are highly sensitive regarding 
privacy. This is why I analyze the given scenario using STPA-Priv in the next 
section. 
The software XSTAMPP offers to store general information on the system in its 
section System Description, as shown in Figure 11. More specific goals of the 
system are put in the section System Goals, as shown in Figure 12. 
"  
Figure 11: XSTAMPP contains a section to describe the system. The whole 
pipeline of STPA-Priv is visible on the left side of the software. The terminology has 
already been updated to be consistent with the terminology in this document. 
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Figure 12: System goals can be entered in this section of XSTAMPP. System 
goals are general descriptions of purposes of the system. A detailed description or 
additional notes can be added on the right side. 
5.2. Applying STPA-Priv to eHealth-Scenario to Elicit 
Privacy Risks using XSTAMPP 
5.2.1. Identify Involved Participants and their Relationships 
It is important to identify participants of my scenario: This helps us define the 
system and be clear about consequences and relationships between individuals. 
Involved participants can be either data sharers or data observers. The 
relationship can be either out of social or commercial interest with different 
interests to protect disclosed information, which is reflected in the trust the data 
sharer has towards other participants. 
I now want to find participants in my system which are directly related to the main 
character (diabetes child) or data he or she is sharing. Identifying participants is an 
iterative approach. New participants can be added during the process of STPA-
Priv. [29] 
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From the perspective of the main character I identified five main participants in the 
system: The parents, the physician, the company that produced the smart device, 
urban planners and the health insurance company. This can be extended even 
further when considering third parties that might be impacted by my system and 
could play an important role . Their interests and level of trust are interesting for us 
to rate their relevance in the system, their attitude towards privacy and potential 
risks [29]. Later, this helps us to find related adverse consequences. The 
visualization of participant in the two-dimensional grid can be seen in Figure 13. 
I used different strategies to identify participants. The first and obvious source is 
the scenario itself which already provides a list of participants. It is also useful to 
take a look at potential malicious data observers and impacts of the system 
beyond its borders. Participants that are involved in developing and maintaining 
the hardware and software that is being used to collect, share and store private 
data are interesting to look at as well [29]. 
"  
Figure 13: This figure shows the different participants of the scenario (red) in a 
two-dimensional grid to visualize type and strength of relationship from the 
perspective of the data provider. The grey entities are displayed for reference. 
5.2.2. Selecting the Privacy Risk Model 
When discussing privacy it is important to have the same understanding of 
privacy. This is especially important when designing a privacy-aware system where 
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different people are involved. In my case I selected the LINDDUN privacy threat 
tree, which is part of the LINDDUN privacy threat modeling methodology. The 
threat tree offers a wide range of privacy issues, arranged in seven categories with 
many sub-categories: linkability, identifiability, non-repudiation, detectability, 
information disclosure, unawareness and non-compliance. The threat tree helps 
us to identify adverse consequences in the next step. 
5.2.3. Identify Adverse Consequences 
Applying the first step of STPA-Priv to the scenario seemed unfamiliar and difficult 
in the beginning. Focussing on privacy issues instead of security or safety hazards 
required restructuring the mindset to use this approach. The first thing to ensure is 
to choose the right level of abstraction: Adverse consequences are not only about 
findings hazards related to the unintentional disclose of private data. It is required 
to go one step further and find concrete instances of adverse consequences 
which could be triggered by an unintentional disclosure of information.  
The main problem I faced is that the field of privacy and possible adverse 
consequences resulting from privacy vulnerability is huge, whereas each concrete 
system with its concrete scenario is always a very special use case. This requires 
special knowledge for this specific problem and a general approach might not 
cover all possible consequences. The LINDDUN threat tree was a great help to be 
able to consider different privacy threats: I was able to identify two adverse 
consequences on the field of linkability, which is the first category of the LINDDUN 
privacy threat catalog. The first adverse privacy consequence is that urban 
planners can link individual data sets so they know that they come from the same 
patient. The second one regarding linkability is when other players can estimate 
the health state of a player, which belongs to the LINDDUN category of 
information disclosure as well. The next category covers issues with identifiability: I 
found two adverse consequences in this field. The first one is that other players 
can see the identity (name, address) of a player, which is part of the unawareness 
category as well, and the second one making it possible for urban planners to 
identify players from provided location information and health data sets. I did not 
find any adverse consequences in the field of non-repudiation, but in the next 
category which is about detectability. Insurance companies could get to know 
about the diabetes disease of a player without being involved in the process. The 
meta information that the person is using the app is already enough that the 
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insurance companies know that the child suffers from diabetes. This could lead to 
a rejection when registering for a new insurance. I was able to identify most 
adverse consequences in the next category which covers information disclosure: 
Insurance company has access to detailed blood sugar values or detailed location 
data; the smart device company has access to detailed blood sugar values or 
location data; the physician receives detailed location information; other players 
can track the location of the player or the parents can track the location of their 
child. The last category of the LINDDUN threat tree where I found adverse 
consequences is unawareness: This occurs when the user is not aware of active 
analytics program and is therefore suspect to surveillance. 
All adverse consequences with their appropriate LINDDUN category are 
documented in Figure 14 using XSTAMPP and Table 4 for better readability.  
"  
Figure 14: Adverse consequences are added in the appropriate section of 
XSTAMPP. 
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Adverse Privacy 
Consequences
LINDDUN 
Category
Hazardous System States
Urban planners can link 
individual data sets so they 
know that they come from 
the same player.
Linkability Data sets submitted to urban planners include 
information about player.
Data sets submitted to urban planners include 
pattern that can identify individuals.
Other players can estimate 
health state of player.
Linkability, 
Information 
Disclosure
High score allows assumptions on health state.
Other players can see 
identity (name, address) of 
player.
Identifiability, 
Unawareness
High scores include personal information of 
player.
Urban planners can identify 
player from provided GPS 
and health data.
Identifiability Data sets submitted to urban planners include 
information about player.
Data sets submitted to urban planners include 
pattern that can identify individuals.
An insurance company gets 
to know about the existence 
of the diabetes disease of 
the player.
Detectability The system reveals who is using the app.
Insurance company has 
access to detailed blood 
sugar values.
Information 
Disclosure
Detailed blood sugar values are sent to insurance 
company as part of the general therapy data.
User decides to stop using the device and sends 
it back to the insurance company without 
deleting its content.
Insurance company has 
access to detailed location 
data.
Information 
Disclosure
Detailed location data is sent to insurance 
company as part of the general therapy data.
User decides to stop using the device and sends 
it back to the insurance company without 
deleting its content.
High score allows assumptions on health state.
Smart device company has 
access to detailed blood 
sugar values.
Information 
Disclosure
Analytics data includes detailed blood sugar 
values.
User sends device to company for repair without 
deleting its content.
Smart device company has 
access to detailed location 
data.
Information 
Disclosure
Analytics data includes detailed location data.
User sends device to company for repair without 
deleting its content.
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Table 4: Adverse consequences and their hazards in the scenario. Each adverse 
consequence is categorized according to the LINDDUN privacy threat tree. This 
helps identify adverse consequences. 
5.2.4. Identify Hazardous System States  
The goal of this step is to identify hazardous system states that are related to the 
adverse consequences from the previous step. The idea is that adverse 
consequences themselves cannot be prevented, but the triggers that lead to 
these consequences can be prevented. These triggers are called hazardous 
system states, because systems in these states can potentially lead to adverse 
consequences: The first adverse consequence “Urban planners can link individual 
data sets so they know that they come from the same player” has two different 
hazards. The first one occurs when data sets that are submitted to the urban 
planners contain information about the player and the second one if the data sets 
include any kind of pattern that could identify individuals. The next adverse 
consequence “Other players can estimate health state of player” can be reached 
from the hazard “High score allows assumptions on health state”.  
All hazardous system states have been added in the appropriate section of 
XSTAMPP, as showed in Figure 15. Hazards and adverse consequences are then 
linked with each other, as shown in Figure 16 and Table 4. 
Other players can track 
location of player.
Information 
Disclosure
High scores include location information.
Physician receives detailed 
location information.
Information 
Disclosure
Long-term health information includes location 
data.
Parents can track location of 
children.
Information 
Disclosure
Parent alert system always provides location 
information.
User is not aware of active 
analytics program and is 
therefore suspect to 
surveillance.
Unawareness Privacy policy has not been presented to user.
User ignored privacy policy and did not read it.
Adverse Privacy 
Consequences
LINDDUN 
Category
Hazardous System States
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"  
Figure 15: Hazardous system states can be collected in XSTAMPP under their 
appropriate category. 
"  
Figure 16: Adverse consequences and their appropriate hazards can be linked in 
XSTAMPP, such as I did in Table 4. Select an adverse consequence from the left 
list and then select all hazards that are related to this adverse consequence. Click 
on Add to confirm. 
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5.2.5. Derive Privacy Constraints from Identified System Hazards  
Privacy constraints are generated from the hazards list by converting the hazard 
into a constraint that must be valid to ensure that the hazard cannot occur. The 
whole list of resulting privacy constraints can be seen in Figure 17, where I used 
XSTAMPP in order to document the constraints. For better readability all 
constraints are also documented in Table 5. For instance, Data sets submitted to 
urban planners include information about player result in the privacy constraint 
Data sets that are submitted to urban planners must not contain information about 
players. 
"  
Figure 17: Privacy constraints are the result of analyzing possible hazardous 
system states. 
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Table 5: Privacy constrains derived from hazardous system states. 
Hazardous System States Privacy Constraints
Data sets submitted to urban planners include 
information about player.
Data sets that are submitted to urban planners 
must not contain information about players.
Data sets submitted to urban planners include 
pattern that can identify individuals.
Data sets that are submitted to urban planners 
must not contain pattern that could help to 
identify individuals.
High score allows assumptions on health state. High scores must not contain information that 
could allow assumptions on the health state.
High scores include personal information of 
player.
High score must not include personal 
information.
The system reveals who is using the app. The system must not reveal who is using the 
app.
Detailed blood sugar values are sent to 
insurance company as part of the general 
therapy data.
General therapy data must be filtered when 
transferring it to insurance companies.
User decides to stop using the device and 
sends it back to the insurance company 
without deleting its content.
Data must be deleted from device before 
sending back to insurance company.
Detailed location data is sent to insurance 
company as part of the general therapy data.
Detailed location data must not be part of 
general therapy data that is sent to the 
insurance company.
High score allows assumptions on health state. High scores must not allow assumptions on 
health state.
Analytics data includes detailed blood sugar 
values.
Analytics data must not include detailed blood 
sugar values.
User sends device to company for repair 
without deleting its content.
Data must be deleted from device before 
sending device in for repair.
Analytics data includes detailed location data. Analytics data must not include detailed 
location data.
High scores include location information. High scores must not contain location 
information.
Long-term health information includes location 
data.
Long-term health information must not include 
location information.
Parent alert system always provides location 
information.
Parent alert system only provides location 
when critical blood sugar level has been 
detected.
Privacy policy has not been presented to user. Privacy policy must be presented to user.
User ignored privacy policy and did not read it. User must read privacy policy.
"  of "61 84
5.2.6. Control Structure Diagram 
Control structure diagrams are a general overview of all components and sub-
systems of the system that should be analyzed. It reflects the hierarchical structure 
and layers of abstraction within the system. Interacting components are 
connected with an annotated arrow. This arrow represents data flow and can have 
different attributes which contain information about the relationship and 
exchanged data types. 
Control structure diagrams help to identify control actions that can lead to adverse 
consequences and even to find additional adverse consequences. Creating the 
diagram itself is an iterative task and can be improved and completed during the 
process. In my scenario I started with a very basic control structure diagram which 
only contained two sensors, a smart device and a data observer. After identifying 
more and more participants with their relationships I have added them to the 
diagram with appropriate controllers. 
"  
Figure 18: This control structure diagram has been created using the XSTAMPP 
tool. This is a first draft of the control structure diagram with the most obvious 
elements from the scenario. In this case the smart device (“watch”) is the central 
instance which reads blood sugar values and sends a GPS location to the parents 
when extreme blood sugar values occur. However, there are still many aspects 
missing, especially control loops have not been considered so far. 
After iterating a few times on the process I decided to separate the diagram into 
three layers of abstraction to make them more consistent with the field of privacy; 
especially because the principle of feedback loops requires rethinking for privacy. 
The result of the first iteration can be seen in Figure 18. All components can be 
put together in one diagram but I split it into three parts to improve the readability. 
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The diagram became too complicated to be able to handle it within XSTAMPP 
comfortably. This is why I used a third party tool to visualize these diagrams. The 
first diagram in Figure 19a shows the high-level control structure. The company 
produces smart devices, which are then recommended by physicians to be used 
to improve the therapy of diabetes patients. The process is represented by the 
usage of this device. The awareness for privacy and privacy violations represents 
the feedback mechanism that can result in stopping using this service or device or 
suing the company. This awareness is the essential part of this feedback loop. The 
company has no motivation to consider privacy carefully without the public 
awareness for privacy. External individuals and organizations such as independent 
inspection authorities, activists, whistle blowers and leaks help understand what 
companies do with the patients’ data and if their usage complies with laws and 
policies. Their recommendations help potential and current users to evaluate this 
product. 
"  
Figure 19a: The high-level control structure of the scenario including the law, a 
physician, the user itself and the loop to ensure the privacy in this system. 
The second control structure diagram is on user-level, as shown in Figure 19b. 
This represents all interaction where the user is directly involved, where the user 
starts an action or receives any kind of feedback. The diagram consists out of five 
control-loops that are all somehow connected to the user of this system. The first 
two are data collection controllers: The location controller and blood sugar 
controller ensure that the user is aware of data collection, in this case location 
information and blood sugar values. The next two control loops ensure that all 
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sensitive data is removed from the device before sending it in for repair or back to 
the insurance company. The fifth and last user-level control loop takes care of the 
privacy policy that contains important information on how data is being collected, 
processed and shared. It is therefore very important that the user has read it and 
knows what happens to their data. This controller aims to ensure that the user has 
read the policy. This is a good example for an open-loop controller, because the 
controller can never ensure that the user really read the policy. 
"  
Figure 19b: The user-level control structure diagram of the scenario.  
The third part of the control structure diagram represents all technical control 
loops. These ensure that certain data sets do not leave the device without being 
filtered or are not shared with third parties at all, as shown in Figure 19c. The 
controllers handle data sets and ensure that different participants receive 
appropriately filtered data sets. The health condition controller collects data from 
the location controller and blood sugar controller and handles the filtering and 
dissemination of these data sets. Results are shared with the urban planners, long 
term health controller and game controller. The long term health controller 
provides data sets for the physician in order to analyze and improve the therapy. 
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The game controller itself generates data for the high score controller and the 
usage controller.  
"  
Figure 19c: The control structure diagram of all technical control loops. The 
location controller and blood sugar controller are references to the user-level 
control loops from Figure 19b. 
5.2.7. Step 1: Identify Privacy-Compromising Control Actions (UCAs) 
The goal of this step is to find control actions from the control structure that could 
violate the previously defined privacy constraints. This can occur in one of the four 
categories (not providing, providing, providing too early or too late or in wrong 
order or stopping the control action too soon). The privacy-compromising control 
actions together with their privacy-compromising system behavior are listed in 
Table 6 and in Figure 20 using XSTAMPP.  
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Table 6: The privacy-compromising control actions table shows privacy-
compromising system behavior. 
Privacy-Compromising 
Control Action Caused by… Privacy-Compromising System Behavior
Provide analytics data. Providing…causes 
hazard
Sending analytics data when user is not 
aware of analytics program.
Providing analytics data when data includes 
blood sugar information.
Providing analytics data when data includes 
location information.
Provide general therapy 
data to insurance.
Providing…causes 
hazard
Providing therapy data to insurance company 
when data includes detailed blood sugar 
values. 
Providing therapy data to insurance company 
when data includes location information. 
Provide long-term health 
information to physician.
Providing…causes 
hazard
Providing long-term health information to 
physician when data includes location 
information.
Provide health and 
location data for urban 
planners.
Providing…causes 
hazard
Providing health and location data when data 
includes information about player.
Providing health and location data when data 
sets include pattern that could lead to 
identification.
Providing health and location data when data 
sets include pattern that could help to link it 
to other data sets.
Reset device. Not providing…
causes hazard
Not deleting therapy data from device when 
sending back to insurance.
Not deleting therapy data from device when 
sending to company for repair.
Submit high scores. Providing…causes 
hazard
Submit high score when score could reveal 
health state information.
Submit high score when score includes 
location information.
Submit high score when score includes 
personal information.
Wrong timing…
causes hazard
Submit high score when score could reveal 
health state.
Send location to parents. Providing…causes 
hazard
Send location to parents when no extreme 
blood sugar value is present.
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Figure 20: Control actions can be added in the appropriate section within 
XSTAMPP. They are then listed within the Privacy-Compromising Control Actions 
Table. This table allows to link them to specific hazardous system states. 
5.2.8. Step 2: Generate Causal Scenarios 
The last step of STPA-Priv concludes the privacy-risk analysis. This step generates 
causal scenarios that result in privacy-compromising control actions, which then 
violate privacy constraints. The violation of privacy constraints could then lead to a 
hazardous system state which could result in an adverse consequence. In other 
words: Adverse consequences can be prevented by eliminating causal scenarios 
that could trigger privacy-compromising control actions. 
Table 7 lists one or more causal scenario for each privacy-compromising control 
action. This helps developers identify problems and fix them. For instance the 
privacy-compromising control action Sending analytics data has two causal 
scenarios: The privacy policy has not been presented to the user so the user was 
not able to understand which data is used for analytics and The user did not read 
the privacy policy so the user does not know which data is used for analytics. 
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Caused by Privacy-Compromising 
Control Actions Causal Scenarios
Sending analytics data when user is not 
aware of analytics program.
The privacy policy has not been presented to the 
user so the user was not able to understand 
which data is used for analytics.
The user did not read the privacy policy so the 
user does not know which data is used for 
analytics.
Providing analytics data when data includes 
blood sugar information.
Usage controller filters data incorrectly.
Providing analytics data when data includes 
location information.
Providing therapy data to insurance 
company when data includes detailed blood 
sugar values. 
Providing therapy data to insurance 
company when data includes location 
information. 
Providing long-term health information to 
physician when data includes location 
information.
Health condition controller filtered data incorrectly.
Providing health and location data when 
data includes information about player.
Health condition controller filtered data incorrectly.
Providing health and location data when 
data sets include pattern that could lead to 
identification.
Providing health and location data when 
data sets include pattern that could help to 
link it to other data sets.
Not deleting therapy data from device when 
sending back to insurance.
The user does not delete their data before sending 
it back to insurance. The insurance can therefore 
access sensitive data that is stored on this device.
Not deleting therapy data from device when 
sending to company for repair.
The user does not delete their data before sending 
the device to company for repair.
Submit high score when score could reveal 
health state information.
The existence and frequency of submitted scores 
could reveal information.
Submit high score when score includes 
location information.
The game controller does not filter data correctly 
and sends location information to the score board.
Submit high score when score includes 
personal information.
The game controller does not filter data correctly 
and sends personal information to the score 
board.
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Table 7: Causal scenarios for hazardous system behavior that has been caused 
by privacy-compromising control actions. 
5.3. Applicability of STPA-Priv for Eliciting Privacy Risks 
in our Scenario 
The application of STPA-Priv to the scenario shows that STPA’s extension for 
privacy is indeed applicable and delivers useful results. I was able to identify 
participants and their relationships which helped to identify adverse consequences 
within the privacy risk model. Resulting hazardous system states and privacy 
constraints could be generated similarly to standard STPA. The resulting privacy-
compromising control actions could be generated using the control structure 
diagrams. In the end, I was able to reveal different privacy risks in form of casual 
scenarios that can be used for testing and improving the system. 
In addition to Shapiro’s changes to the terminology [6] of STPA I had to improve 
the process in order to make it more consistent: I restructured the tasks in the 
pipeline and refined each step to make the whole process of STPA-Priv more 
consistent with STPA. I added a preparation step which includes identifying 
participants and relationships. This helps to identify adverse consequences and 
the draw the control structure diagrams later on. In contrast to Shapiro I used the 
LINDDUN privacy threat model which provides a finer granularity of privacy 
threats. Better results can be expected from a threat model with finer granularity in 
contrast to Shapiro’s approach using a coarse framework. I improved the control 
structure diagram, which has not received much attention in Shapiro’s publication. 
I tried different strategies to implement control structures for this scenario. In the 
end, I decided to split them up into three layers of abstraction in order to clarify 
their meaning. High-level and user-level control loops make sense and are useful 
for the following steps of STPA-Priv’s pipeline. I renamed actuators into initiators 
and sensors into feedback mechanisms. Even with the renaming it is still unclear if 
Send location to parents when no extreme 
blood sugar value is present.
The health condition controller calculated the 
blood sugar level wrong or analyzed sensor values 
incorrectly. The parents are therefore notified 
accidentally.
Caused by Privacy-Compromising 
Control Actions Causal Scenarios
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technical feedback loops are really useful for privacy evaluation: Does it make 
sense in real software projects to ensure that data sets have been cleared from 
certain data points, as described in section 4.3?  
5.3.1. Usability of XSTAMPP for STPA-Priv 
To support the analysis process I used the existing software XSTAMPP which has 
been developed by University of Stuttgart [21, 22]. XSTAMPP offers an 
implementation for the process of STPA, which is useful for STPA-Priv as well. 
There has already been an update for XSTAMPP which supports STPA-Priv that I 
described in sections 2.4 and 4.2.  
Several changes have already been implemented in XSTAMPP in order to support 
STPA-Priv: Losses are labeled Adverse Consequences, Security or Safety 
Constraints are labeled Privacy Constraints and Insecure or Unsafe Control 
Actions are labeled Privacy-Compromising Control Actions. 
These changes make sense and help engineers to elicit privacy risks. However, 
some modifications in the software are still necessary to be consistent with STPA-
Priv and improve the overall experience. Larger control structure diagrams in 
XSTAMPP are not well-arranged. I had to use a third-party tool in order to provide 
an appropriate representation for this bachelor’s thesis. The visual editor within 
XSTAMPP should be improved to handle larger control structures as well.  
It would be useful to represent the three layers of abstraction for control loops in 
XSTAMPP as well. It would be great if they can be created in three different views, 
but can still be linked to each other. If linked correctly they could be shown in an 
overall diagram together or in three separate diagrams to improve the readability. 
Vulnerabilities should be renamed to hazardous system states.  
In the view Linking Adverse Consequences and Vulnerabilities there is a wrong 
label: The table with adverse consequences is titled vulnerabilities. This is wrong. 
They should be titled adverse consequences instead. 
After restarting the computer, the STPA-Priv extension for XSTAMPP disappeared 
frequently and had to be reinstalled. 
"  of "70 84
After all, XSTAMPP is already useful for the use of STPA-Priv. The additional 
suggestions to improve the software are not requirements that make the software 
unusable right now. However, they would increase the usability. Especially the 
control structure diagram editor within XSTAMPP required using a third party tool 
in order to create better readable diagrams.  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6. Conclusion and Future Work 
When analyzing systems for privacy risks it is useful to use an existing process 
that helps to elicit risks, such as STPA-Priv. I described the extension of STPA for 
privacy, STPA-Priv, and how it can be used for privacy engineering. I described a 
realistic eHealth scenario that requires privacy risk analysis and used STPA-Priv to 
elicit privacy risks in this scenario. I was able to generate adverse consequences, 
a control structure diagram of my scenario, privacy-compromising control actions 
and, in the end, scenarios in which privacy is at risk. This shows that the general 
idea of STPA-Priv works and that it is helpful in real-world scenarios. The straight-
forward and well-defined methodology which is based on STPA is not limited to 
single components but considers all layers of abstraction within systems.  
The application of STPA-Priv to the eHealth scenario shows that disadvantages of 
existing privacy analysis techniques can be overcome by STPA-Priv. This includes 
the ability to cope with various privacy requirements of complex socio-technical 
systems. However, it makes sense to make use of existing technologies within the 
pipeline of STPA-Priv: The series of open questions from section 3.3 stimulate 
engineers to find data flow, relationships and participants which helps to identify 
adverse consequences. The privacy threat catalogue from the LINDDUN 
methodology from section 2.6 is a great framework for privacy risks and helps 
identify adverse consequences as well. The control and feedback approach 
described in section 3.4 is one important aspect of user-level control loops, which 
are part of the control structure. So, after all, STPA-Priv has been able to 
overcome many of the problems that existing techniques have but it makes sense 
to continue using some of them as part of STPA-Priv. 
The application of STPA-Priv to this scenario can only serve as an initiation to 
analyze further application scenarios with it. An empirical evaluation similar to 
Wuyts, Scandariato and Joosen [33] would be useful to be able to classify the 
effectivity of STPA-Priv. Different participants receive the same scenario, and one 
group should analyze it using STPA-Priv. These results are then compared to 
results of privacy experts in order to see how many privacy risks could be elicited 
using STPA-Priv. This would reveal different properties of STPA-Priv, such as 
correctness of risks, completeness of risks and reliability. 
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In any way, I can recommend using STPA-Priv to evaluate projects for privacy risks 
despite the fact that there are still changes needed. Nevertheless, these changes 
do not change the overall method which is very straight-forward and applicable to 
privacy. 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